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Introduction
The two models of international trade with developed factor markets -Heckscher-Ohlin and Speci…c Factors -both su¤er signi…cant defects. For example, their predictions about the patterns of domestic production and international trade are unsatisfying. Except in the case of two goods and two factors, Heckscher-Ohlin production and trade patterns are either indeterminate or uselessly complex. In the Speci…c Factors model, these patterns have little intuitive appeal (Jones and Neary, 1984, page 24) . For another example, the Speci…c Factors model was developed in order to explain why industries rather than factors lobby for protection (Mayer, 1974; Mussa, 1974) . Unfortunately, the explanation is driven entirely by the deus ex machina assumption of immobile factors. This raises questions about what economic process generates the cross-industry distribution of immobile factors and why the immobility itself is not explained by the theory (Leamer, 1980; Grossman, 1983) .
We show that these problems stem from the extreme assumption that factors are either perfectly mobile across industries or perfectly immobile. To avoid this problem we model labour markets using the Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) variant of the Roy (1950 Roy ( , 1951 model which describes the sorting behaviour of heterogenous workers endowed with two attributes e.g., problem-solving and communication skills.
1 Workers sort across industries based on Ricardian comparative advantage. Industries di¤er by skill requirements and each worker sorts into the industry that pays the most for her particular bundle of skills. As a result, each heterogeneous worker has a preference for a particular industry because the next best alternative industry pays discretely less. Further, heterogeneity of workers means that even within an industry some workers are less productive and hence less well paid than others. These least productive workers will be the …rst to switch out of the industry should …rms in the industry lower wages. This makes each industry's partial equilibrium supply of labour slope upwards. Restated, unlike the Heckscher-Ohlin and Speci…c Factors models, factors are neither perfectly mobile nor perfectly immobile and the degree of mobility is generated endogenously.
This simple alternative to the Heckscher-Ohlin and Speci…c Factors models leads to …ve important results. First, we obtain a complete generalization of the Rybczynski and
Heckscher-Ohlin theorems for the case of arbitrarily many industries. Partial mobility is the key to this remarkable result since it implies that industry supply functions are continuous and upward sloping. In contrast, in the Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian models industry supply is discontinuous and in…nitely elastic where price equals average cost. In the Speci…c Factors model the arti…ce of exogenous speci…city makes industry supply continuous and upward sloping, but this comes at a cost: the patterns of domestic production and international trade have little intuitive appeal. Further, the patterns depend heavily on the cross-industry distribution of speci…c factors, a distribution that is exogenous and for which little intuition is available.
Second, partial mobility leads to new predictions about the political economy of protection. A worker who is a very good …t with the industry is endogenously immobile and demands protection for her industry. A worker who is only a modestly good …t with the industry is endogenously more mobile and will support protection for all industries that intensively use her type. The tension between the 'long-run'Stolper-Samuelson prediction about factor-based lobbying and the 'short-run'speci…c factors prediction about industrybased lobbying is eliminated. Leamer (1980) and Grossman (1983) were the …rst to recognize and deal with this tension. However, our resolution improves considerably on this earlier research by eliminating the need for exogenous mobility costs.
Third, while the e¤ects on trade of international di¤erences in average endowments are well known, nothing is known about the e¤ects of other moments of the distribution of worker types. For example, since average endowments per capita are similar across rich countries it is often argued that the distribution of endowments cannot explain NorthNorth trade. However, it is also often argued that di¤erences between Japanese and U.S.
workers in ‡uence production patterns and comparative advantage. For example, Japanese comparative advantage in goods involving long chains of production and requiring reliability is often ascribed to a more uniform distribution of such skills as e¤ective communication in worker circles. We model this in terms of higher moments of the distribution of worker characteristics. The idea that higher moments matter was put forward by Grossman and Maggi (2000) and Grossman (2004) . We extend their insights using a very di¤erent model of labour markets.
Fourth, our model easily handles international technology di¤erences without requiring
it. Countries that use older vintages of technology survive by skimming the cream, that is, by operating at a smaller level of output and employing only those few workers whose skills are almost a perfect match for older-vintage technologies. While almost perfect, these matches are less productive and less well paying than rich-country matches of workers to new-vintage technologies. This is an essential observation for development economics where the international coexistence of old and new technologies has long been highlighted (Pack, 1984) .
Fifth, the predictions of the model do not require factor price equalization. Worker earnings can di¤er across countries and will di¤er within industries because of di¤erences in worker skills. As a result, we are able to develop the rich predictions about inequality associated with the Roy model. We discuss within-group inequality and within-industry inequality and then investigate the impact of trade and skill-biased technical change on these inequality measures.
The model we will be presenting is most closely related to the international trade model of Leamer (1999) . Leamer considers a model with sorting based on a single worker characteristic, namely e¤ort. E¤ort complements capital which leads to worker sorting. Introducing a second worker characteristic, as we do, leads to additional and important predictions about production, trade, earnings and inequality.
Our work on North-North trade is strongly in ‡uenced by Grossman and Maggi (2000) and Grossman (2004) though the mechanisms are di¤erent. In Grossman and Maggi (2000) machines are produced in long chains of production involving many workers. The machine is reliable only if each worker's input is reliable. This 'supermodularity' means that in equilibrium each hired worker will have a minimum level of talent. In contrast, software output depends on the input of the most talented worker. This 'submodularity' means that one hired worker will be highly talented and the remaining workers untalented. The main prediction is that the country with the greater dispersion in worker talents will have a comparative advantage in software. In our model there is no teamwork between workers, but there is 'teamwork'between the two attributes that a worker brings to the workplace.
This leads to our section 5 trade-and-dispersion result. In Grossman (2004) , machinery requires teamwork and software does not. Teamwork is subject to costly monitoring and incomplete contracting, which encourages talented workers to sort into software. Trade leads the country with greater dispersion in talent to increase software production. This resolves the contracting problem for talented workers, thus raising inequality. In contrast, our section 5 inequality-and-dispersion result is driven by sorting rather than incomplete contracting.
Our research is also related to an excellent paper by Ru¢ n (1999) who uses Rosen's (1978) model of two-factor sorting to explain away the tension between the political economy predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin and Speci…c Factors models. However, in his model worker heterogeneity is not enough to explain away the tension. His argument relies critically on allowing capital to be perfectly mobile across industries, something we will not need or want: worker heterogeneity even without any capital accomplishes the same end in a crystal clear way. This last point indicates that our work is related to Melitz (2003) who uses …rm heterogeneity to generate an upward-sloping supply of …rms into export markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2-3 set up the model. Sections 4-6 develop multi-good Rybczynski, Heckscher-Ohlin, and income distribution theorems for higher-order moments of the distribution of endowments. Sections 7-9 describe the implications of the model for political economy, international technology di¤erences and domestic income inequality.
The Model
Each worker brings two attributes to the workplace, h and l. While human capital and brawn are obvious and familiar attributes, in describing trade among rich countries we also have in mind subtler attributes such as problem-solving abilities, communication skills, and team-work skills. A type (h; l) worker employed in industry i produces a task level of t i (h; l).
Each worker chooses the industry that pays the most for her attributes. This leads to worker sorting based on the standard logic of Ricardian comparative advantage.
2
An employer cannot unbundle a worker's attributes and thus cares only about t i (h; l).
This 'bundling'assumption is the core assumption of a large class of Roy-like (1950; 1951) models. The particular formulation used here is due to Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) .
3
For simplicity we make two assumptions which together ensure that a worker's marginal product is log-linear in h and l. First, we assume that industry output Y i is the sum of the tasks performed by workers in the industry. Mathematically, if industry i employs a set of workers whose attributes (h; l) lie in a set h l then output is
where f hl (h; l) is the measure or number of (h; l) types in the economy and where A i is a Hicks-neutral technology parameter. The linearity of output in worker tasks is the standard 2 The logic is usually stated as follows. With two industries and two workers types (h; l) and (h 0 ; l 0 ),
implies that the (h; l) type sorts into industry 1 and the (h 0 ; l 0 ) type sorts into industry 2. This Ricardian sorting mechanism is fundamental to our model. We repeat it here only because it will be harder to see once more structure is added to the model. 3 See also Rosen (1972 Rosen ( , 1974 Rosen ( , 1981 , Willis and Rosen (1979) , Sattinger (1980) , Heckman and Scheinkman (1987) , Bartel and Sicherman (1999) and especially Rosen (1978) and Heckman and Honoré (1990). simpli…cation in the sorting literature because it implies that a worker's marginal product is independent of the characteristics of other workers in the industry e.g., Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) . Notice that we have no other inputs such as capital. These can be introduced but add no additional insights. Given equation (1), the log earnings of a type (h; l) worker is
where q i is the producer price.
Second, we assume that the task function is log-linear:
of generality, we rank industries such that i is increasing in i. In this way, i indexes the h-intensity of the industry. This is needed for Heckscher-Ohlin-style predictions.
4
Under these two assumptions, equilibrium with sorting is easily characterized. To facilitate this, de…ne L ln l; S ln(h=l); and
1. In models with a continuum of industries, there is perfect sorting so that all workers in an industry are the same in key aspects e.g., Sattinger (1975) and Teulings (1995) . This allows one to generalize the industry production function. However, the continuum-of-industries assumption is useless here because it is precisely the heterogeneity of workers within each industry that interests us.
2. In models with only 2 industries, one can always rede…ne or 'rotate'attributes so that only one factor is used in each industry e.g., Heckman and Honoré (1990) and Ru¢ n (1999). In our setting, this is equivalent to setting 1 = 0 and 2 = 1. Since we allow for n > 2, such rotation is not possible and our approach is clearly more general.
3. In the remaining models (2 < n < 1), either there is a …nite number of worker types or a Leontief production assumption e.g., Rosen (1978) . Again, our production function is more general than this and the generality is substantive.
Then ln t i = L + i S i and the log earnings of a type (S; L) worker employed in industry i is given by
Sorting is illustrated in …gure 1 which plots w i (S; L) L = p i + i S against S. The …gure plots these earnings pro…les for industries i 1, i, and i + 1. A worker with an S between
earns the same in industries i and i + 1. Thus, the sorting rule is
where
; S 0 1; and S n 1: higher earnings so that the w i (S; L) L pro…le shifts up. Then industry i …rms will attract slightly more workers (those with S near either S i 1 or S i ). That is, the partial equilibrium supply of workers to the industry is upward sloping. This di¤ers from the Heckscher-Ohlin and Speci…c Factors models. In the former, a slight rise in industry wages attracts an in…nite
Choose i+1
Choose i
Choose i-1 supply of workers. In the latter, a slight rise in industry wages attracts either an in…nite supply or no additional supply depending on whether labour is the mobile or immobile factor. Our model lies in between these extremes.
Note also that an upward-sloping supply of workers will imply an upward-sloping industry supply function. This does not appear in the Heckscher-Ohlin model (except via general equilibrium feedbacks) and appears in the Speci…c Factors model only through the deus ex machina of an exogenous …xed factor. The fact that an employer cannot unbundle a worker's attributes and thus cares only about t i (h; l) is important for generating an upward-sloping supply of workers. Indeed, bundling is a standard sortingliterature device for inducing upward-sloping supplies. Further, upward-sloping supplies are often taken as evidence in favour of the bundling hypothesis. More formal evidence from structural econometric models With the sorting rule in place it is useful to …ll in the details of the equation (1) 
the measure or number of type (S; L) workers in the economy. 6 Then
Turning to the de…nition of equilibrium, labour market equilibrium is described by a set of earnings functions w i (S; L) ; i = 1; :::; n that satisfy pro…t-maximizing demand for tasks (equation 3) and earnings-maximizing supply of tasks (equation 4). Product markets are perfectly competitive and equilibrium in product markets is described by a set of producer prices q 1 ; : : : q n . We will sometimes discuss the determination of the q i , especially when comparing autarky with free trade. At other times we will take the q i to be exogenous. This is in keeping with a small open economy facing exogenous world product prices and trade costs.
For some of the results of this paper we will need to make an assumption about f SL (S; L).
Since there are no scale e¤ects in the economy we take f SL to be a density function i.e., a positive function that integrates to unity. We follow the time-honoured tradition in the Roy can be found in Willis and Rosen (1979) , Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) , Heckman and Scheinkman (1987) , and Bartel and Sicherman (1999) .
If workers can unbundle their h and l and take them to di¤erent industries then we are in a HeckscherOhlin world. If they must take their h and l to the same industry, but …rms can unbundle workers'h and l (i.e., the …rm only cares about the aggregate amounts of h and l that are hired) then we are almost in a Heckscher-Ohlin world, though now both countries and …rms must be in the factor price equalization set. This point is developed in a debate between Welch (1969) and Rosen (1983) .
6 f SL (S; L) is induced trivially by f hl (h; l) together with equation (2).
literature of assuming that S and L are bivariate normal:
is the correlation between S and L. and L are not particularly interesting parameters so that we almost always set them to unity. All results in this paper hold for the general case of 6 = 1 and L 6 = 1: This is explicitly shown in the appendix proofs where we do not restrict or L . Appendix C gives an expression for output under the assumption of normality.
The Role of Two Attributes: Income Distribution
The obvious thing about …gure 1 is that workers are sorting based on the single attribute S just as in Leamer (1999) . What then is the role of two attributes? It turns out that both attributes are needed to discuss production, earnings, and earnings inequality. In particular, is crucial. To see this recall that under normality the expectation of L given S is
From this and equation (3), the average log wages of type S workers who have sorted into
The top panel of …gure 2 plots E (LjS) against S and plots a contour line for f SL (S; L) for industries. This wage pro…le is piecewise linear with slope i + on S 2 (S i 1 ; S i ). The and terms correspond to productivity and two-attribute sorting e¤ects, respectively. Holding
That is, workers with more S produce more t i and hence earn more. This is the productivity e¤ect. Further, @E (Lj S) =@S = i.e., the average amount of L that an S type has depends on . If is negative then higher S is associated with lower L and hence with lower productivity and earnings. This is the two-attribute sorting e¤ect.
Figure 2 displays the case where 1 + < 0 < 2 + so that the two-attribute sorting e¤ect dominates in industry 1 and the productivity e¤ect dominates in industry 2. More generally, the average earnings pro…le illustrated in …gure 2 can be downward sloping, Vshaped, or upward sloping. The message to be taken from this is that while S determines worker sorting, it does not determine the amount of the other productive asset L that workers bring to the workplace. Thus, S alone does not determine output, earnings, or inequality.
Have and Have-Not Economies ( )
The next three sections describe the role of the distribution of endowments for the patterns of production and trade. We start with . An economy with a high positive value of is a 'have and have-not'economy. Workers either have a lot of both S and L or have very little of both S and L. International di¤erences in are readily explained by a host of international di¤erences in institutions and policies. For example, Sweden has a strong institutional bias towards redistribution and extensive social policies involving early childhood interventions which ensure that each worker obtains at least one marketable attribute. 7 In contrast, in the United States where these institutions and policies are muted, the acquisition of S and L are more highly correlated because acquisition is driven by causes such as parental income that a¤ect both S and L. This is consistent with evidence that intergenerational mobility 7 See Tre ‡er (2004) for further discussion.
is lower in the United States than in countries such as Sweden and Canada (Björklund and Jänti 1997; Blanden 2004) . See Solon (2002) for a survey. Thus it is of interest to assume that the Swedish is smaller than the U.S. . We now investigate the implications of this for the patterns of production and trade.
Production: Rybczynski Revisited
To get Since E (ln t i j S) = E (w i j S) p i , the bottom-panel wage pro…les are similar to the output pro…les.
As rises the average level of L falls for workers with endowment S < S 1 so that the average level of output Y 1 falls. For workers with endowment S > S 1 , the opposite is true so that Y 2 rises. This is a Rybczynski-style result: as rises, Y 2 rises relative to Y 1 . Rybczynski results typically hold in clear form only when there are two industries. A remarkable feature of our …gure 3 result is that it holds for any number of industries.
: : : ; n. That is, an increase in the correlation between S and L increases the output of S-intensive industries relative to L-intensive industries.
The proof of the theorem is not di¢ cult. However, it does requires some additional
Let g(S ; L) be an arbitrary function of (S ; L) and let E ( g(S ; L) j a < S < b ) be the expectation of g for those workers with an S between a and b. 8 The following lemma will be used repeatedly.
8 If this is not clear see the precise mathematical statement in appendix equation (18).
Proof of Lemma 1: S i 1 x < S < S i x implies S i 1 < S + x < S i . Hence
Proof of Theorem 1: As shown in appendix D, di¤erentiation of Y i with respect to
As rises, Y i rises relative to Y i 1 . It would be nice to add to this the existence of an industry i such that all industries i > i expand and all industries i i contract. A su¢ cient condition for this is S 1 < < S n 1 . 9 With many industries so that industries 1 and n are small (i.e., S 1 is a large negative number and S n 1 is a large positive number) this condition will be satis…ed.
Trade: Heckscher-Ohlin Revisited
In this section we consider trade patterns between two economies that di¤er only in terms of . The conventional wisdom is that the similarity of endowments among Northern countries makes the Heckscher-Ohlin model irrelevant for describing North-North trade. Recent 9 From lemma 1 and equation (11),
which is positive for S n 1 > . Since d ln Y i =d switches signs between i = 1 and i = n and is increasing in i there must exist an
research suggests otherwise by pointing out that North-North trade is partly driven by subtle di¤erence among Northern workforces in such dimensions as communication skills and team-work. For example, consider studies of workplace change involving new technologies combined with new forms of work organization such as team production, statistical process control, and total quality management. As Osterman (1995) points out, the most striking assessments of the productivity bene…ts of such workplace innovations are studies that contrast U.S. and foreign …rms. There are two studies that will be known to economists. Bailey and Gersbach (1995) demonstrate that communication and team skills, in additional to technical skills, are much more important in German enterprises than in American enterprises. This results in a German comparative advantage in products involving long chains of production. Murnane and Levy (1996) review di¤erences in the worker screening practices of U.S.-owned versus Japanese-owned auto plants located in the United States. Japanese interviewers focus on the ability to solve problems in changing environments, the ability to work in groups, and the ability to communicate e¤ectively. Murnane and Levy (1996) then show that Japanese screening for these skills translates into higher productivity. These studies demonstrate that subtle di¤erences in workers'skills are important for productivity and hence for comparative advantage.
To model this we begin by establishing that when there are only two industries, the loweconomy has a higher autarky price of good 2 (relative to good 1) and hence a comparative advantage in the L-intensive industry 2.
10 Assume that preferences are homothetic and identical internationally. Also assume that the economies are identical except for di¤erences in . It follows from theorem 1 that in autarky the low-economy will have a low Y 2 =Y 1 and hence a high relative price of good 2 (a high ln q 2 ln q 1 ). The opening up of trade will lower ln q 2 ln q 1 . Since p i ln(q i A i ), the opening up of trade will lower p 2 p 1 and, from equation (5), raise S 1 . The rise in S 1 leads to an expansion of industry 1 and a contraction of industry 2. Further, the lower ln q 2 ln q 1 raises consumer demand for industry 2 relative to industry 1 so that in equilibrium, the low-economy exports good 1 and imports good 2. That is, we obtain the standard comparative advantage results.
We turn next to a trade theorem for the multi-industry case. We make the usual Heckscher-Ohlin similarity assumptions. Theorem 2. Let assumption 1 hold. Also assume that the distribution of endowments f SL (S; L) is the same internationally except that the correlation between S and L is larger at home than abroad. Then there exists a unique industry i < n such that the home country exports all relatively S-intensive commodities (i > i ) and imports all relatively
The proof is simple and appears in appendix E.
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The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem predicts trade based on levels of S and L. Theorem 2 predicts trade based on a higher moment of the distribution of endowments. Also, in contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model our production and trade predictions are determinate and easily described even when there are more than two goods.
Earnings and Inequality
We have already seen in the bottom panels of …gure 3 that as rises average earnings fall in L-intensive industries (i i ) and rise in S-intensive industries (i i ). This is a general result. From equations (9) and (10),
This implies that as rises average earnings fall in L-intensive industries and rise in Sintensive industries. 12 Thus, when comparing Sweden with the United States, the high-U.S. economy will have higher average wages in S-intensive industries as compared to
Sweden. The U.S. will also have lower average wages in L-intensive industries as compared to Sweden.
We next turn to inequality. Our model has a lot to say about within-industry inequality as measured by the variance of log earnings within an industry. To keep the notation simple, let V ( w i (S; L) j i ) be the variance of wages conditional on choosing industry i (that is, conditional on S i 1 < S < S i ). From appendix equation (26), this is just
The term 1 2 is the within-group variance where 'group'is de…ned as the set of workers with the same S.
is the between-group variance.
13 Thus a rise in has within-group and between-group e¤ects on inequality. In the case where < 0 and i + > 0 for all i, the within-and between-group e¤ects move in the same direction.
The high-economy will have higher within-group, between-group, and within-industry inequality in all industries.
Much of the empirical work on trade and wages has focussed on between-group inequality e.g., production-nonproduction worker wage di¤erentials. When > 0, as it most certainly is in the United States, between-group inequality is rising in .
One conclusion that emerges from this section is the care that is needed in isolating the e¤ects of trade on inequality. determines both the pattern of trade and the level of earnings inequality. A that is higher in the United States than in Sweden causes both U.S.-Swedish trade and higher between-group inequality in the United States than in Sweden. In trying to assess the impact of trade on inequality in cross-country studies one must therefore be very careful to ensure that the correlation between trade and inequality is not being driven by a third, unobserved factor, namely .
13 At the risk of some di¢ cult but obvious notation, the standard within-between decomposition may be written as
where the …rst and second terms on the right are the within-group and between-group variances, respectively.
Endowment inequality
We next turn to the role of endowment inequality. Consider two economies, one of which has more mass in the tails of its bivariate density f SL (S; L) and hence has more individuals with extreme values of either S or L. This will have implications for trade ‡ows and inequality that are related to those discussed in Grossman and Maggi (2000) and Grossman (2004) .
As noted in the introduction, our trade mechanism is related to the Grossman and Maggi (2000) supermodularity mechanism and our inequality mechanism is very di¤erent from the
Grossman (2004) incomplete-contracts mechanism. To focus ideas consider …rst a simple example with 3 goods: movies, information technologies, and machinery. The production of
Hollywood ‡icks is intensive in creativity L and the production of Silicon Valley information technologies is intensive in numericity S. In contrast, machinery is an 'O-Ring'reliable good whose production involves many components and whose overall reliability is the reliability of the least reliable component. Reliability therefore depends on a mix of worker skills in the sense of requiring both L and S. If, say, the United States has a more unequal distribution of endowments than Germany, then the United States will export movies and information technologies to Germany and Germany will export machinery to the United States.
Formalizing this is tricky because there is no good de…nition of 'greater inequality'for bivariate distributions. We proceed by de…ning a form of mean-preserving spread for bivariate distributions. To ease notation we have been setting the variance of S ( ) and the variance of L ( L ) to unity. In this section we reintroduce and L explicitly. We de…ne a bivariate mean-preserving spread as an increase in and L that does not change means E(S) and
This is satis…ed by increases in and L that leave = L unchanged. Let be an index of endowment inequality and let ( ) and L ( ) be increasing unit-elastic functions so that d ln( = L )=d ln = 0. Then an increase in raises variances and L without a¤ecting means or conditional means. We associate an increase in endowment inequality with an increase in .
14 5.1. Production: Rybczynski Revisited
An increase in has no e¤ect on the sorting rule (the S i ) nor our diagrams. All that an increase in does is redistribute the mass of f SL away from its middle towards its tails. Therefore, the most L-intensive and S-intensive industries attract more workers and experience a relative rise in output.
Theorem 3. Consider an increase in endowment inequality . There exists a generically unique industry i with i < n and with the following properties.
(1) Consider two L-intensive industries i.e., industries with i i . Then as inequality rises, the more L-intensive of the two industries experiences a relative increase in
(2) Consider two S-intensive industries i.e., industries with i > i . Then as inequality rises, the more S-intensive of the two industries experiences a relative increase in
When i > 1, part (1) states that dY 1 =d > dY 2 =d > : : : > dY i =d and part (2) states that dY n =d > dY n 1 =d > : : : > dY i =d . That is, the most L-intensive and S-intensive industries expand relative to industries near i .
Proof:
The proof is not di¢ cult, but requires some notation. De…ne
Then as shown in appendix F, di¤erentiation of Y i with respect to yields
Let i be the industry for which S i 1 < 0 S i : Without loss of generality we ignore the integer constraint and let i be the industry for which S i = 0.
Consider part (1) of the theorem where i i so that S i 1 < S i 0. In this case, the equation (12) condition S i 1 x < S < S i x implies S i 1 < S + x < S i < 0 or
Now consider part (2) of the theorem where i i + 2 so that 0 S i 2 < S 2 i 1 < S i .
In this case, S
Finally, consider part (2) of the theorem where To formalize this we will need i in theorem 3 to be greater than 1 so that there is at
i ( i + L ) then theorem 3 holds both for i and i + 1. This means that i is not unique and that d ln(Y i +1 =Y i )=d ln = 0, both of which violate the theorem. However, for almost all parameters (i.e., generically),
It follows that i is generically unique and that d ln(Y i +1 =Y i )=d ln > 0 generically. least one extremely L-intensive industry (i = 1).
Theorem 4. Let assumption 1 hold and assume that i > 1. Also assume that the distribution of endowments is more unequal in the home country than in the rest of the world i.e., the home country has a larger than the rest of the world. Then there exist two industries i and i (with 1 i < i n ) such that the home country imports all goods i with i < i < i and exports all other goods. That is, the home country exports all goods that are either extremely L-intensive (i i ) or extremely S-intensive (i i ).
The proof is relegated to appendix G.
Theorem 4 demonstrates that di¤erences in endowment inequality provide a coherent account of trade between rich countries. To return to our example above, the United States has greater endowment inequality than Germany. As a result, the United States has a comparative advantage in Hollywood ‡icks, which intensively use creativity L. The United
States also has a comparative advantage in Silicon Valley information technologies, which intensively use numericity S. On the other hand, Germany has a comparative advantage in machinery and other 'O-ring'reliable goods produced using long chains of production and for which each link requires moderate levels of both S and L in order to ensure reliability.
Our model also provides implications for inequality. We state without proof that the country with greater endowment inequality will have greater within-industry inequality
Average endowments
We …nish up our discussion of endowments and trade with the role of the average level of endowments. This is a standard Heckscher-Ohlin exercise. Intuitively, a country with a high average S per worker (i.e., a high ) should have production patterns that are skewed towards S-intensive goods. This in turn should lead the country to export S-intensive goods.
That is, an increase in the mean level of S increases the relative output of S-intensive industries.
Proof of Theorem 5: As shown in appendix H, di¤erentiation of Y i with respect to
where E i is de…ned in lemma 1. Hence lemma 1 establishes that d ln Y i =d ln is increasing in i.
As in the discussion following theorem 1, if there are many small industries then there will be an industry i such that output expands for the most S-intensive industries (i i ) and contracts for the most L-intensive industries (i < i ). Note that i is the same industry as the i industry in theorems 1 and 2.
The Rybczynski theorem 5 has immediate implications for trade ‡ows.
Theorem 6. Let assumption 1 hold. Also assume that the home country is more Sabundant than the foreign country in the sense of having a larger . Then there exists a unique industry i > 1 such that the home country exports all relatively S-intensive commodities i i and imports all relatively L-intensive commodities i < i .
See appendix I for the proof.
This is our counterpart to the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. Note that we have obtained it without reference to the number of goods, cones of diversi…cation or factor price equalization.
The Political Economy of Protection
Although workers can move costlessly from industry to industry, our labour market does not are endogenously immobile in the sense that it will take almost total industry collapse to induce them to switch industries. These workers demand protection for their industry and only their industry. To the extent that they succeed in organizing a lobby, the lobby will 16 Of course, the worker is paid the value of her marginal product and in this sense there are no rents.
w i (S,L) -L S S i S i-1

With tariff
Without tariff be industry-based as in the Speci…c Factors model. Workers who are near the boundary S i 1 are endogenously mobile in the sense that they will switch into industry i if industry i receives a tari¤ and switch into industry i 1 if industry i 1 receives a tari¤. These workers do not demand protection for a particular industry. Rather, they demand protection for industries that intensively use worker types near S i 1 . To the extent that such workers succeed in organizing a lobby, the lobby will consist exclusively of workers whose S is near S i 1 . That is, the lobby will be factor-based as in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
Such heterogeneous worker responses to changes in industry fortunes are frequently observed in the data. In response to impending mass lay-o¤s, workers who stay with the …rm typically do better than those who are laid o¤, but do less well than those who voluntarily quit. This is indicative of worker sorting. Workers who quit are closer to S i 1 while those who are laid o¤ are closer to the middle of the interval. Jacobson et al. (1993) provide strong evidence on these points using data drawn from the early 1980s import surge that devastated the Pennsylvania steel industry. Casual empiricism suggests many other examples e.g., union members often disagree about whether or not to strike -workers near S i 1 , who have good outside options, are less supportive of a strike than workers near the middle of the interval [S i 1 ; S i ].
Returning to our prediction that industry-based and factor-based lobbies will coexist, note that there is now abundant evidence that the Stolper-Samuelson and Speci…c Factor lobbying predictions are both partially supported by the evidence. Magee et al. (1989) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999) …nd evidence in support of the proposition that industry-based lobbying is important. Rogowski (1989) (2002) is short run. Further, many industry lobbies have succeeded in obtaining long-run protection. For example, the steel industry has been protected since the 1960s despite the fact that all of its 1960s capital stock was written o¤ due to the introduction of new technologies such as the 'mini mill'. A simplistic distinction between long and short periods is clearly not rich enough to explain the coexistence of industry-and factor-based lobbying. Our model points to the need for identifying the degree of worker speci…city and shows clearly how this is to be estimated in terms of a standard econometric sorting model. Our model also shows that the degree of speci…city and how it evolves in response to industry shocks is central for explaining the evolution of international trade protection.
Finally, despite important similarities between our model and the Speci…c Factors model, there are important di¤erences. We have already seen one. In the Speci…c Factors model the speci…c factor is homogeneous. In our model the speci…c factor is heterogeneous and this heterogeneity is both what generates upward-sloping industry supply functions and what generates the coexistence of industry-and factor-based lobbying. A second di¤erence is that in the Speci…c Factors model the speci…c factor is exogenous, as is its distribution across industries. In our model the degree of speci…city and the distribution of the speci…c factor across industries is endogenous. This provides both a deeper level of explanation and results in sharper predictions about trade and the political economy of protection.
International Technology Di¤erences
In the Ricardian model and in extensions to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, international technology di¤erences typically lead to specialization. This is hard to reconcile with work by Pack (1984) and others on the international coexistence of di¤erent vintages of technology.
In our model, a country using an inferior technology can still compete by essentially skim- .
How large can international technology di¤erences be before there is Ricardian specialization i.e., before the rich country becomes the sole producer of i? When A P oor i drops to A i or below, the poor country is so unproductive in industry i that the poor-country industry shuts down. A i is trivial to compute. Noting from equations (2)- (5) Theorem 7. Consider international di¤erences in technology A i .
A rise in
A i raises output in industry i (dY i =dA i > 0), lowers output in industries i 1
, and leaves output in all other industries unchanged (dY j =dA i = 0 for j 6 = i 1; i; i + 1).
2. Let assumption 1 hold except that A i is higher in the home country than in the foreign country. (a) If A i > A i in both countries then good i is produced in both countries.
(b) The home country exports good i while importing goods i 1 and i + 1.
With only two goods, the theorem reduces to the standard Ricardian result, namely, dY 2 =dA 2 > 0 > dY 1 =dA 2 and the home country exports good 2 while importing good 1. However, with only two goods 1 = S 0 < S 1 < S 2 = 1 i.e., both countries must produce both goods.
Thus, sharp Ricardian specialization cannot occur.
Trade and Inequality
The Heckman and Sedlacek model that we are using, and indeed most variants of the Roy model of labour markets, yield very rich predictions about the determinants of inequality.
Given length constraints of this paper, we focus on within-industry inequality. Despite the importance of within-industry inequality -after all, trade policy is typically conducted at the industry level -within-industry inequality has received virtually no attention. Bartel and Sicherman (1999) is the exception.
Consider a tari¤-induced increase in the price of good i. As in …gure 4, this expands both ends of the interval [S i 1 ; S i ]. Recall from …gure 2 that average wages take on their extreme values at S = S i 1 and S = S i . 17 Thus, within-industry inequality rises because the tari¤ attracts workers both with very high and very low wages. Theorem 8 formalizes this.
Theorem 8. An increase in the industry i price (due perhaps to a tari¤) raises inequality in the industry:
Further, an increase in the industry i price lowers inequality in industries i 1 and i + 1:
The proof appears in appendix K and uses the fact that dV (S j i) =dS i > 0 and dV (S j i) =dS i 1 < 0. We emphasize that international trade impacts on inequality only via the sorting rule i.e., only via the impact of q i on S i and S i 1 .
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It is tempting to argue that international trade must either lower or raise inequality in all industries. Theorem 8 make it clear that international trade can raise inequality in some industries while lowering inequality in others. To investigate further we calculated changes in within-industry inequality using 1984-1994 Current Population Survey data. We found that 1984-94 changes in V (w i (S; L)j i) ranged from 0:06 in Logging to +0:11 in Footwear. Thus, despite rising inequality economy-wide, changes in industry-level inequality have varied widely across industries. Equation (15) serves as a basis for investigating whether this variation can be explained by industry-speci…c trade shocks.
This leads us naturally to a discussion of how within-industry inequality is impacted by international trade (changes in q i ) versus skill-biased technical change (changes in i ).
Both of these alter the sorting rule
only skill-biased technical change has direct e¤ects on inequality. The reason is a deep one. Earnings depend on price multiplicatively so that a price change has a proportionate e¤ect on the earnings of all workers in the industry. Restated, q i has no direct e¤ect on the within-industry variance of log earnings. q i operates only via the sorting rule. In contrast, skill biased technical change has the direct e¤ect of making S more productive. Figure 6 illustrates this point.
In the left-hand panel of …gure 6, a rise in the price of industry 2 raises inequality in
International Trade (Rise in q 2 ) steepens the earnings pro…le of industry 2. A rise in 2 can increase or decrease S 1 . In …gure 6 we illustrate the case where skill biased technical change decreases S 1 . In this case, the sorting e¤ect complements the direct productivity e¤ect in increasing inequality. More generally, the two e¤ects can be o¤setting, which raises the possibility that unskilled-biased technical change in developing countries may have raised inequality there.
A key conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that skill biased technical change has a richer set of channels for altering within-industry inequality than does international trade.
19 Since …gure 6 plots w i (S; L) L, for this claim to be rigorous we must know what is happening to the variance of L. However, the variance of L conditional on S is just 1 2 . Since this is independent of S and the industry of a¢ liation, we can ignore the variance of L.
Both trade and skill biased technical change a¤ect inequality by altering the sorting rule.
However, only skill biased technical change has direct e¤ects on within-industry inequality. This is due to the fact that skill biased technical change di¤erentially alters workers'marginal products whereas trade alters all workers'marginal products by the same proportion. Our observation thus o¤ers a deep insight into relative channels for the trade-and-wages debate.
Conclusions
We examined the implications of worker sorting for the patterns of domestic production and international trade as well as for the demand for protection, income distribution and economic development. Borrowing from Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) , our model featured heterogeneous workers who di¤er in two dimensions e.g., problem solving and communication skills.
We started o¤ by showing that two-skill heterogeneity leads to much richer predictions for production, earnings, and inequality than does the one-skill heterogeneity of, say, Leamer (1999). We then described how higher moments of the bivariate distribution of skills are interesting predictors of trade between rich countries. For example, 'have and have-not' economies such as the United States with its high will export S-intensive goods to Sweden and import L-intensive goods from Sweden. For another example, economies with high levels of endowment inequality will export goods that intensively use either S or L, but not both. We used this to explain U.S. dominance in industries such as …lm and information technologies and to explain German dominance in machinery and other 'O-Ring' reliable goods involving long chains of production.
A key feature of our model is that it yields sharp and easily characterized predictions about international patterns of production and trade, even in the case of many goods. In the Heckscher-Ohlin model these predictions are sharp and easily characterized only in the 2-good, 2-factor case. The Heckscher-Ohlin predictions fall ‡at in all other cases. 20 In the Speci…c Factors model the patterns of production and trade depend on impossibly detailed supply elasticities (Jones and Neary, 1984, page 24) . These elasticities in turn depend on the cross-industry distribution of industry-speci…c factors, a distribution that is exogenous and for which little intuition is available. Thus, our model provides a major improvement in our ability to concisely and intuitively predict international patterns of production and trade.
Our model o¤ers an alternative explanation for the demand for protection. The HeckscherOhlin model predicts factor-based lobbying, which has proved useful for understanding broad trade policy debates between labour and capital e.g., Rogowski (1989) and O'Rourke and
Williamson (1999) . The Speci…c Factors model predicts industry-based lobbying, which is useful for understanding short-run lobbying by industries with clearly identi…able and exogenous speci…c factors e.g., mining. Our model predicts both industry-and factor-based lobbying and emphasizes the tension within an industry between those who are endogenously immobile (demanders of industry-based protection) and those who are endogenously mobile (demanders of factor-based protection). Our analysis o¤ers an empirically implementable framework for thinking about the sources of worker immobility or speci…city, something the Speci…c Factors model does not and cannot o¤er.
The model presented o¤ers two additional insights. It explains how a country with a backward technology can survive international competition and how this leads to low earnings. Also, the model has rich predictions about the e¤ects of trade and skill-biased technical change on income distribution. Future research suggested by the model includes
(1) empirical work on di¤erences in inequality across industries, (2) empirical work on the role of speci…city for lobbying behaviour, and (3) the role new technologies play in enabling multinationals to unbundle worker skills and thus locate design and production in di¤erent countries.
A. Notation
Let SL (S ; L ) be the standard normal bivariate density function for (S ; L ). Let (S ) be the univariate standard normal cumulative distribution function and let (S ) be the corresponding density. Let
be the truncated bivariate normal density. For any function g(S ; L ), denote its conditional expectation by
and its conditional variance by
When a = S i 1 and b = S i we adopt the simpler notation:
This completes the discussion of notation. We turn next to moments of SL (S ; L j a < S < b).
B. Moments of the Truncated Bivariate Normal Distribution
The moment generating function of the truncated normal bivariate distribution is
This is useful because as is shown in any introductory statistics textbook,
One can likewise derive
Since (21) and (23) imply
from which it follows that
C. Output
Applying the equation (16) change of variable to equation (6) yields
From equation (17) with b = S i and a = S i 1 this can be written as
From this and equation (20) evaluated at (u; t) = ( i ; 1),
We will use this expression repeatedly in what follows.
D. Proof of Equation (11)
Di¤erentiation of equation (27) yields
Simplifying using equation (21),
where the second equality comes from equation (19) i.e. i = i L . Equation (11) follows from the de…nition of E i ( i ) in lemma 1.
E. Proof of Theorem 2
Let Y W i be world output of good i. By market clearing it equals world consumption of good i. Let C i be home consumption of good i. By homotheticity, C i =Y W i equals the home country's share of world income and so is the same for all i. By theorem 1,
is increasing in i. Let T i Y i C i be net exports. By balanced trade, at least one good is exported and at least one good is imported. Since
is increasing in i, if T i > 0 then T i+j > 0 for all j > 0 and if T i < 0 then T i j < 0 for all j > 0. It follows that there is a unique i < n such that T i > 0 for i > i , T i 0, and T i < 0 for i < i .
F. Proof of Equation (13)
We begin with a preliminary result. Any variance can be rewritten as the expectation of the square minus the square of the expectation. Thus, V (S i ja < S < b) = E (S 2 ja < S < b) [E ( S ja < S < b)]
2 . Plugging this into equation (22) 
We next provide an expression for d ln Y i =d ln . Di¤erentiation of equation (27) with respect to yields +( i + i )E S jS i 1 i < S < S i i :
We next provide an expression for d ln Y i =d ln L . Di¤erentiation of equation (27) with respect to L yields
From equation (21) and
Finally, from the de…nition of , an increase in leads to proportional increases in and L : d ln =d ln = d ln L =d ln = 1. Thus, from equations (30)- (31) and is increasing in i there must be a good i such that T i < 0 for i = i ; : : : ; i 2; T i 1 0; and T i > 0 for i = i ; : : : ; n. Similarly, suppose that some good i < i is exported. Then since T i =Y W i is decreasing in i there must be a good i such that T i > 0 for i = 1; : : : ; i 1; T i 0; and T i < 0 for i = i + 1; : : : ; i . It remains to show that some good i > i is exported and some good i < i is exported.
Let be the home country's income share. By homotheticity, C i = Y W i . Since i < n by assumption, theorem 3 implies Y n > Y w n . Hence T n Y n C n > 0 i.e., some good i > i is exported. Since i > 1 by assumption, theorem 3 implies Y 1 > Y w 1 . Hence T 1 Y 1 C 1 > 0 i.e., some good i < i is exported.
H. Proof of Equation (14)
From equation (27),
Simplifying using equation (21) and substituting in i = i L from equation (19) yields
Equation (14) follows from the de…nition of E i ( i ) in lemma 1.
I. Proof of Theorem 6
By comparison of equations (11) and (14), the proof is identical to the proof of theorem 2.
J. Proof of Theorem 7
The derivative of output in industry i with respect to ln A i is:
The derivatives of output in industries i 1 and i + 1 with respect to p i are:
To prove part 2 of the theorem let Y 
K. Proof of Theorem 8
From equation (26) with V(S ji) written out in full as V(S jS i 1 < S < S i ), the derivative of the variance of log earnings in industry i with respect to q i is dV (w i (S; L)j i) dq i = 2 i dV(S jS i 1 < S < S i ) dS i dS i dq i + 2 i dV(S jS i 1 < S < S i ) dS i 1 dS i 1 dq i :
From equations (2) and (5), dS i =dq i = 1=( i+1 i ) and dS i 1 =dq i = 1=( i i 1 ) from which equation (15) follows. Heckman and Sedlacek (1985, proposition 1) states that dV (S j i) =dS i > 0 and dV (S j i) =dS i 1 < 0 if S is distributed according to a log concave distribution. The normal distribution is log concave. Applying this to equation (15) yields dV (w (S; L)j i)=dq i > 0:
The derivatives of the within-industry variance of log earnings in industries i 1 and i + 1 with respect to q i are given by:
